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Abstract 
 
CO2 emission of industrial facilities is a major cause of climate change that affects the 
ecosystems, human beings and environment. Capture, Transport and Storage of CO2 
(CTSC) is a novel technology of mitigating the impacts of climate change. The 
uncertainties concerning long term reliability of CTSC technology give rise to the 
significance of risk assessment for CTSC activities.  
Since CTSC is a complex sociotechnical system, traditional risk assessment approaches 
are not appropriate for CTSC. Lessons learned of industrial accidents show that a 
combination of technical, organizational and human aspects of risk results in 
occurrence of accidents. Therefore, we recommend to develop an integrated risk 
analysis framework for CTSC chain. The framework is developed by modeling CTSC 
chain by system dynamics approach. System dynamics is a support for risk assessment 
that allows understanding the interactions of CTSC system's elements in the first step, 
and then study the behavior of the system over time both in normal operation mode and 
in case of a failure or deviance. 
In this paper, the methodology is explained in detail, and the application of the 
methodology for an integrated CTSC project is discussed.   
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In this article, a methodology is proposed to develop a dynamic risk analysis framework 
for Capture, Transport and Storage of CO2 (CTSC). CTSC is an emergent technology of 
mitigating CO2 emissions in the atmosphere and climate change impacts. Nevertheless, 
risk assessment is a fundamental issue for sustainability of CTSC technology. Our 
proposed methodology is to model CTSC system by system dynamics approach, and 
then integrate system dynamics with risk analysis results in order to analyze the 
behavior of the system in case of a failure or a deviation from normal operation. The 
paper contains four sections. In the first section, we introduce CTSC system and how it 
contributes to mitigate climate change impacts. Afterwards, we discuss why a new risk 
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analysis framework is required for CTSC, and why system dynamics approach is 
appropriate for analyzing risks associated with CTSC system. Then, we review some of 
the available risk analysis approaches that are based on systems thinking and system 
dynamics. The third section is devoted to our methodology and applying the approach 
for a case study. The paper wraps up with a summary of conclusions and future work. 
 
1. Climate change and CTSC 
 
1.1. CTSC contribution to climate change 
 
Climate change is a major environmental concern of our time, affecting ecosystems, 
food productivity, coast lines, water availability and human beings’ health. CO2 
emission to atmosphere is the most significant anthropogenic reason of climate change. 
According to Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 1, several methods 
are available to avoid, reduce or control the emission of CO2 to atmosphere. CTSC is 
one of these options leading to 19% of emissions’ reduction by 2050 (GCCSI, 2009). 
Improvement of energy efficiency, renewable sources of energy, and switch to less 
carbon-intensive fuels are some of the other possibilities to mitigate climate change 
(IPCC, 2005). Different countries choose the appropriate mitigation options based on 
their resources and their policies.   
The ultimate goal of CTSC is to store the emitted CO2 of industrial plants in geological 
formations or oceans for long periods of time (hundreds or thousands of years). 
Therefore, studying the potential risks of CTSC is necessary to ensure that CTSC will 
not have an adverse impact on the environment and on human beings' health, and to be 
assured of the sustainability of CTSC. The leakage of the stored CO2 to the water 
resources may change the acidity of water, and affect the flora and fauna, and even the 
human beings when the water resource is a potable one. Large releases of CO2 to the 
atmosphere from the storage location will result in the exposure of humans and other 
living species to the CO2. The risks of exposure to CO2 depend on the concentration of 
the released CO2 and duration of exposure.  
In the following paragraphs, we present a brief introduction of CTSC technology before 
discussing CTSC risk assessment. 
 
1.2. CTSC technology, a brief introduction 
 
CTSC is an emergent technology that refers to a chain of processes used to collect or 
capture a CO2 gas stream, transport the CO2 to a storage location and inject it into that 
location. 
Combustion of fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas in power plants, automobiles and 
industrial facilities is the most significant source of CO2 emissions. Mineral and metal 
production processes, such as cement, lime, iron, steel and aluminum production, can 
also lead to CO2 emissions (EPA, 2010).  
 
 
1 IPCC is the leading body for the assessment of climate change, established by the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) to provide the world 
with a clear scientific view on the current state of climate change and its potential environmental and 
socio-economic consequences (IPCC website). 
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Several processes are available for Capture, Transport and Storage of CO2. We provide 
a brief introduction of each process in the following paragraphs.  
 
Three main processes are available for CO2 capture: 
- Postcombustion: is a chemical or physical process where CO2 is separated from the 
flue gases produced by the combustion of fossil fuels (coal, oil or natural gas) or 
biomass.  
- Oxycombustion: is a process where oxygen is used for the combustion of fuel, instead 
of air. The result is a flue gas with high CO2 concentration.  
- Precombustion: is the process of transforming the fuel to a mixture of carbon 
monoxide and hydrogen (Synthesis Gas), and then producing CO2 by the reaction of 
carbon monoxide with steam in a shift reactor. The resulting mixture of hydrogen and 
CO2 can then be separated into a CO2 gas stream, and a stream of hydrogen.  
 
After capturing, CO2 is transported to the storage location.  
CO2 can be transported either by onshore/offshore pipelines, by tankers or by ships. 
CO2 is in supercritical state while transporting by pipeline, with a pressure of more than 
74 bar (being in supercritical state means that CO2 is at a temperature and pressure 
above its critical point. Critical condition is the highest temperature and pressure at 
which gas and liquid phases are at equilibrium. When CO2 is in supercritical state, it 
behaves like a gas, but its density is close to the liquid density. Critical temperature and 
pressure of CO2 are 31.1°C and 73.9 bar respectively). CO2 transportation by pipeline 
on the liquid state (10 bar and -40°C) is still in the research phase. For long distances, 
CO2 is transported by ship in liquid phase (20 bar and -20°C) (Lecomte et al., 2010). 
Transporting CO2 by road and rail tankers is technically feasible. These systems 
transport CO2 at -20°C and 20 bar. However, tankers are unlikely to be relevant to 
large-scale CTSC, and uneconomical compared to pipelines and ships, except on a very 
small scale (IPCC, 2005). 
 
The transported CO2 can be either stored or reused in industries.  
The principal methods of CO2 storage are as follows (IPCC, 2005):  
- Geological storage: where CO2 is injected to geological formations, for example 
depleted oil and gas reservoirs, to enhance oil or gas recovery. 
- Ocean storage: in this case, CO2 is compressed, transported by a ship and directly 
injected into the ocean (in liquid phase) at a depth greater than 1000 meter, where CO2 
would be mostly isolated from the atmosphere for centuries. Ocean storage is still in 
research phase.  
- Mineral Carbonation or Mineral Sequestration: is based on the reaction of CO2 with 
calcium or magnesium oxide to form insoluble carbonates. 
 
IPCC experts propose another alternative for reducing CO2 emissions. This alternative 
is industrial utilization of CO2. CO2 is already used in production of chemicals such as 
urea, refrigeration systems, inert agent for food packaging, beverages, welding systems, 
fire extinguishers, water treatment processes, horticulture and precipitated calcium 
carbonate for the paper industry. CO2 can be also used for the production of chemicals 
and polymers, such as polyurethanes and polycarbonates. Production of fuels (like 
methanol) from CO2 is another choice if only the source of energy is not fossil-based 
(IPCC, 2005).   
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In 2009, two hundred thirteen (213) active or planned projects of CTSC were identified, 
from which 101 projects are in commercial scale and 62 projects are considered as 
integrated (Global CCS Institute, defines a commercial scale project as the one with a 
storage rate of 1 Mt/year or more. An integrated project is where the capture, transport 
and storage components are undertaken by a single project owner or operator). Seven 
of these 62 integrated projects are already in operation (3 projects in the US, 2 projects 
in Norway, 1 in Canada and 1 in Algeria). These seven projects are collectively storing 
less than 10 Mt/year. Therefore, to achieve the global CO2 emissions reduction target by 
CTSC (10.1 Gt/year by 2050), it is required to increase the annual rate of storage of the 
existing commercial scale projects by 1000 times (GCCSI, 2009). International Energy 
Agency (IEA) anticipates 100 CTSC projects globally by 2020, and 3400 projects in 
2050. (IEA, 2010)  
 
A brief introduction of CTSC technology was presented in this section. In the following 
section, we discuss why a novel risk analysis methodology is necessary for CTSC, and 
why system dynamics approach is appropriate for risk analysis of CTSC chain. Then, 
we present some examples of systemic risk assessment approaches. 
 
2. CTSC and Risk Assessment 
 
2.1. Necessity of a new risk analysis approach for CTSC 
 
So far, several works have been carried out on risk management of CTSC. However, 
most of them involve one subsystem and essentially technical aspects of risk. (Fabriol, 
2009; Bouc et al., 2009; Savage et al., 2004; PTRC, 2004; Benson, 2002; Perry, 2005; 
Koornneef et al., 2010; IRGC, 2009) 2 
 
Lessons learned of industrial disasters show that a combination of technical, 
organizational and human constituents of risk results in occurrence of accidents (ARIA 
Inventaire, 2010; Paté-Cornell, 1993; Jasanoff, 1994). Therefore, we recommend to 
develop an integrated framework of risk analysis for CTSC. The novelty of this 
framework is the possibility to study the interactions of technical, organizational and 
human aspects of risk for CTSC system. Moreover, our approach is a dynamic approach 
that allows studying the risks during the life cycle of the project or any desired time 
scale. To fulfill this target, we propose to integrate system dynamics and risk analysis 
methods to develop a dynamic risk analysis framework for CTSC. This approach allows 
us to consider the interconnections of different variables which could make a failure 
happen in the system.  
 
 
 
 
2 Some studies are available on CTSC integrated risk analysis. For instance, DNV report on HSE issues 
related to large-scale capture, transport and storage of CO2 (Johnsen et al., 2009). In this study, an 
almost integrated analysis has been carried out, including capture, transport and injection phases 
(storage phase is not included).          
Another example of integrated risk analysis is the study performed for Belchatow project, in Poland. 
Technical, financial, organizational, socio-political and regulatory risks associated with a large-scale 
CTSC project have been studied in this project. (Kerlero de Rosbo, 2009) 
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2.2. Why system dynamics approach for risk assessment of CTSC? 
 
System dynamics is a methodology to understand the structure and the behavior of 
complex systems, created during the mid 1950s by Jay W. Forrester in the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). 
 
From then on, system dynamics has been applied in various fields, from management to 
environmental change, politics, economic behavior, medicine, engineering, and recently 
for analyzing accidents and risks (Forrester, 1991; Leveson, 2004; Stringfellow, 2010; 
Garbolino et al., 2009; Garbolino et al., 2010 ). 
 
CTSC is a complex sociotechnical system which includes not only three technical 
components of Capture, Transport and Storage, but also an organizational structure 
containing a group of actors. The interface between organizational, human and technical 
aspects could initiate a failure in the system. System dynamics is an appropriate tool to 
study the interactions of CTSC elements. 
 
The definition of system, complex system, and sociotechnical system may be required 
to recall here. Durand (1979) presents six definitions for "system", made by different 
philosophers and scientists. Most of the definitions highlight the notion of 
"interrelations" between the elements of the system. For instance, "system is a global 
unit organized by interrelationships between elements, actions or individuals" according 
to Edgar Morin (French philosopher and sociologist) (Durand, 1979).  
A "Complex System" is a system in which the behavior of the whole cannot always be 
explained in terms of the behavior of the individual parts. In other words, in a complex 
system, the dynamic interaction of components is more essential than the components 
themselves. This definition of complex system will be used throughout this paper. 
A sociotechnical system is a system consisting of a technical part that is in interaction 
with a social part. The components of sociotechnical system include human beings 
(workers, managers and all the stakeholders of internal and external environment), an 
organizational structure and a technical section (including equipment, methods and 
tools) (Carayon, 2006). These components are in interrelation with the external 
environment of the system. (see Figure 1)   
 
Figure 1: Model of a sociotechnical system 
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2.3. Recent applications of system dynamics in risk assessment 
 
Safety management approaches has evolved according to the lessons learned from 
industrial accidents (figure 2). Until 1960, technical aspect was the main focus of 
attention. Afterwards, human error was brought forward as a significant factor in safety 
management. By mid 1980, lessons learned from the disasters like Three Mile Island, 
Bhopal, Chernobyl and Challenger led to the entrance of organizational and 
management issues into safety management world. Safety culture and resilience are the 
most recent concepts in this field. (Cambon, 2007)  
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of safety management approaches  
(translated from Cambon, 2007) 
 
 
Recent methods of safety management and risk assessment are more systemic. These 
methods place emphasis on the interactions of the system's elements that will give rise 
to the risks. System dynamics is one of the recent approaches applied for analyzing risks 
and accidents. In this section we review some examples of such application. 
 
The first example is a systemic accident model, developed by Leveson in the domain of 
aeronautics. As Dulac (2007) states: “to manage risk in complex engineering systems, it 
is necessary to understand how accidents happen” 3. “As the complexity of engineered 
systems increases, new types of accidents have started to emerge that result from the 
dysfunctional interactions between system components. These accidents result from 
unplanned or unexpected interactions between different components of a system, rather 
than single (or multiple) component failure” (Dulac, 2007) (Second quotation from 
(Leveson, 2004)). Accidents are categorized in two groups: event-chain accidents and 
system accidents. Event-chain accident is an accident which happens as a result of a 
series of events, whereas system accident results from cascading failures (Perrow, 
1999). 
 
 
 
3 Accident’s definition: an unplanned and undesired loss event which results in human, equipment, 
financial or information losses. (Leveson, 2009) 
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Traditional risk analysis methods, such as Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA), 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA), are based on event-
chain accident approach. Therefore, the traditional methods of risk analysis are not 
appropriate for complex systems, because the interactions between different 
components of the system are not considered in these methods (Dulac, 2007). 
 
Based on this reasoning, Leveson has developed a new accident model, called STAMP 
(Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes). This new accident model is based 
on systems theory concepts and particularly on Rasmussen's idea that called into 
question the usual approach of modeling sociotechnical systems by decomposition of 
elements (Rasmussen, 1997). Different actors of the system, from legislatures to 
company's top management, project management, operations management and lower 
levels are taken into account in Leveson’s sociotechnical model. She argues that lack of 
constraints imposed on the system design and on the operations is the main cause of an 
accident, instead of a series of events. Leveson believes that we need to review the 
control actions already available in the system in order to understand why accidents 
happen and prevent losses in future. These control actions could be translated as safety 
constraints. Then we should review why and how inadequate control actions will lead 
the system to a hazardous state. (Leveson, 2004) 
STAMP model could be applied either for analyzing accidents, which have already 
happened, or for evaluating the safety in a system, where an accident has not occurred 
yet.  
 
More recently, Garbolino et al. (2010) have presented a dynamic risk analysis approach 
for a Cl2 storage and transport unit. Their approach includes four steps. The first step is 
to construct the structure of the system in the form of a dynamic model (stock-flow-
feedback structure), develop the causal diagrams which illustrate the interactions among 
the variables of the system, and define the variables of the system. Garbolino et al. have 
selected the STELLA® software to perform dynamic modeling. 
In the next step, potential failures of the system are studied with HAZOP (Hazard and 
Operability) method. In this phase, the failures as well as their causes and consequences 
are identified. 
Afterwards, the failure consequences are modeled. The PHAST software is applied for 
this purpose to evaluate the effects of failures like toxic waste and overpressure on 
human beings and equipment. 
Finally, they go back to dynamic modeling environment in order to evaluate whether 
the available prevention and protection barriers are efficient. If not, new barriers could 
be recommended to be added in the system.  
 
Organizational and human elements are taken into account in the approach of Leveson 
and her team (e.g. Dulac and Stringfellow), while the work of Garbolino et al. deals 
only with the technical constituents of sociotechnical system. 
 
3. Proposed methodology 
 
In this section, we explain our proposed methodology for developing an integrated risk 
analysis framework for CTSC activities. The purpose is to apply system dynamics 
modeling as a support for risk analysis of CTSC system. Modeling CTSC system allows 
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us to evaluate the reliability of the available safety control system to avoid the 
catastrophic situations. Consequences of a minor deviation from the normal operation 
mode in the whole system could be studied by this approach. Furthermore, the effect of 
a combination of failure scenarios on the entire system could be analyzed.  
     
Our methodology is based on what was described in section 2.3. as "systemic 
approaches". The outline is illustrated in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Outline of the methodology  
 
 
1. In the first step, we gather the required data through literature review, engineering 
data of CTSC projects (if available) and interview with experts. Engineering 
information such as process flow diagrams, piping and instrumentation diagrams, 
process descriptions, cause and effect diagrams and risk analysis reports provide us 
with a list of technical variables to be modeled subsequently. Process conditions 
(pressure, temperature, flow rate, concentration, etc.) and control instruments 
(control valves, pressure safety valves, pressure and temperature switches, etc.) are 
the most significant elements that should be considered in the model. For the human 
and organizational part, we use the organization charts and project’s information to 
form a hierarchical structure of the system and the role of each person concerning 
safety control. Experience, education, training, motivation, stress, working 
conditions and communication are some of the major human and organizational 
variables pointed out in several literature (Stringfellow, 2010; Simba Ngabi, 2006; 
Kerlero de Rosbo, 2009; Hollnagel, 1998).  
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Listing the main variables is the prerequisite of the next step, where we develop the 
causal graphs of CTSC system.  
 
2. The interactions of the most significant elements of the system are illustrated in 
causal graphs.  
Our main purpose is to assure that the safety control system in CTSC whole chain is 
reliable. The overall causal graph of the system is illustrated in the following figure. 
The performance of each technical sub-system affects the performance of others. 
The organizational and human performances have an impact on the performance of 
safety management system, which is in direct interaction with the performance of 
our technical system.  
 
Capture
Performance
Transport
Performance
Storage
Performance
Safety Management
System Performance
Organizational
Performance Human
Performance
+
+
-
+
+
+
+ +
++
+
+
+ + +
 
 
Figure 4: Overall causal graph 
 
 
3. After structuring the static model, we can simulate the system to follow up the 
evolution of the system over time.  
4. So far, the system has been modeled in normal operation mode. The subsequent step 
is to introduce failure scenarios to the model to see what happens in case of each 
failure. Failure mode model allows us to compare the behavior of the system in 
normal operation and failure modes.  
5. Afterwards, the available prevention or protection tools (such as alarms, controls, 
procedures) are introduced in the model.  
6. In this stage, we should answer this question: "Are available prevention/protection 
tools sufficient to avoid accidents?" 
7. The positive answer to the question means that the available safety control system is 
reliable. However, the behavior of the system should be continually monitored by 
the model.    
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8. If the answer is negative, the barriers should be modified and reintroduced to the 
model.  
 
The main phases of the methodology were presented in the preceding paragraphs. Now, 
we will analyze our case study and the methodology's application for the case study. 
 
Our case study is an integrated CTSC system as illustrated in figure 5. The main steps 
of the integrated process are indicated in figure 5. CO2 capture process is an 
oxycombustion process. In this process, CO2 is captured from a natural gas stream. The 
only chemical reaction occurs in the boiler between the natural gas and gaseous oxygen, 
coming from the Air Separation Unit (ASU). The boiler outlet is washed and cooled 
down in the gas treatment section. CO2 stream is then compressed in a three-stage 
compressor. An inter-cooler cools down the outlet of each stage in order to separate the 
water from the main CO2 stream. The outlet pressure of compressor is about 27 bara. 
The last stage of the capture process is drying the CO2 stream in a molecular sieve unit. 
Afterwards, CO2 is transported to the storage location through a pipeline of about 30 
kilometers. 
CO2 is compressed again before being injected into a depleted gas reservoir at a depth 
of 4500 meters. 
 
Boiler
O2 from ASU
Natural gas 
Compressor
H2O
CO2 to Pipeline
Gas Treatment Dryer
CO2 Pipeline
Compressor
CO2 Injection to 
gas reservoir
Geological formation
CO2 Capture
CO2 Transport
CO2 Storage
N2 from ASU
H2O
H2O
Steam
 
 
Figure 5: Case study, integrated CTSC system  
 
 
As explained previously, the first action is to list the most significant variables that 
should be controlled in the system illustrated in figure 5. Subsequently, the causal 
graphs are developed for the case study. Principal technical variables of the case study 
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are presented in figure 6. In this figure, the main variables of capture, transport and 
storage are separated out. The positive (+) and negative (-) marks in figure 6 indicate 
the positive and negative relationships. We have started developing the causal graph 
from the five major variables that should be controlled during the life cycle of the 
project (indicated in bold in figure 6). These variables are explained in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: CTSC causal graph, technical variables  
 
 
Two major variables of CO2 capture process are as following: 
 
1. “Purity of CO2, oxycombustion outlet”: 
The purity of CO2 in the outlet of dryer is a crucial variable, because it could result 
in corrosion and clogging in the pipeline. Hydrocarbons, H2S and water are the most 
significant impurities that could cause corrosion. 
CO2 purity in the outlet of dryer depends on the purity of boiler feeds, i.e. oxygen 
and natural gas, and the efficiency of burners.  
As represented in figure 6, the purity of oxygen from ASU is influenced by the 
purity of inlet air to the Air Separation Unit. 
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“ASU inlet air impurities” could also result in corrosion, plugging or undesired 
reactions in the Air Separation Unit. ASU is not considered in the boundary of CO2 
capture unit (figure 5). Therefore, the parameters concerning ASU are not shown in 
the same group as the variables of CO2 capture.  
 
2. “H2O concentration, oxycombustion outlet”: 
The concentration of water in the outlet of CO2 capture unit is the second major 
variable of CO2 capture system. The variation of water concentration will affect the 
purity of CO2 (figure 6). The water is absorbed in several sections of CO2 capture 
unit, including the treatment unit, the compressor and the dryer (as illustrated in 
figure 5). Therefore, separating water from the main CO2 stream is crucial. The 
presence of water in the pipelines results in hydrate formation, corrosion and 
pipeline clogging. 
As represented in figure 6, “H2O concentration at oxycombustion inlet” (the amount 
of water in natural gas), and “molecular sieve efficiency” (i.e. dryer’s efficiency) 
affect the quantity of outlet water.   
  
The other two main variables are related to CO2 transport system: 
 
3. “Pipeline corrosion”: 
“Sweet gas corrosion” or “carbonic acid corrosion” is a major source of damage in 
pipelines (Barrie et al., 2004). Carbonic acid corrosion refers to the corrosion in 
pipelines when CO2 reacts with water and form carbonic acid. As explained 
previously, the presence of water in CO2 pipeline could be interpreted as CO2 
stream impurity. This impurity will result in pipeline corrosion, and clogging as 
well.     
 
4. “Hydrate formation in pipeline”: 
Hydrate formation in pipeline is the second principal variable to be controlled in 
CO2 transport system. Hydrate is a kind of solid ice-like crystal which is formed in 
case of the presence of water in pipeline. CO2 enters the water lattice and forms the 
hydrate. Hydrate formation could reduce the pipeline flow capacity and plug the 
transport system (Serpa et al., 2011). For this reason, the concentration of water in 
CO2 pipeline in a critical point. 
  
The compressor discharge pressure or temperature change create two-phase stream in 
the pipeline. “Phase change in pipeline” increases the chance of pipeline failure (Serpa 
et al., 2011).   
 
The last major variable is “risk of leakage” that concerns to the storage system. 
 
5. “Risk of leakage”: 
Our principal goal is to maintain the reliability of the safety control system in long 
term. The leakage of CO2 is a parameter that directly affects the safety in long term. 
Wellbore pressure change, wellbore temperature change, atmospheric CO2 
concentration around wellhead, and the quality of potable water are the variables 
that could indicate CO2 leakage from the reservoir. 
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As shown in figure 6, CO2 leakage or pipeline failure could give rise to damage for 
human beings  and environment, and accordingly loss of public support and the project’s 
owner image loss. Delay in project’s schedule and additional cost are the other ultimate 
consequences of CO2 leakage. To maintain the safety in long term, the risk of CO2 
leakage should be reduced. These latter parameters are represented in italic in figure 6.  
 
The organizational and human causal graph is illustrated in figure 7. The objective of 
this paper is not to detail all the organizational and human variables and their 
interconnections. Nevertheless, we make a summary in this section.  
We have started from the major variable (safety in long term). The causal graph has 
been developed based on the items that could affect the main variable. The variables of 
figure 7 are selected according to some literature on the organizational and human 
aspects of risk (Jones, 2005; Rudolph and Repenning, 2002; Groeneweg, 2002; Bouloiz, 
2010; Stringfellow, 2010; Simba Ngabi, 2006; Kerlero de Rosbo, 2009; Hollnagel, 
1998). 
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Figure 7: CTSC causal graph, organizational and human variables  
 
 
As illustrated in figure 7, the following parameters have a direct influence on the “safety 
in long term”: pressures (such as time, schedule and resources), quality of 
communication between the actors of the system, availability of procedures, respecting 
the procedures, continual improvement of safety management system, availability of 
Personal Protective Equipment, reporting the incidents and lessons learned during the 
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life cycle of the project. However, all the other variables of figure 7, which have an 
indirect feedback on the “safety in long term”, have the same significance in achieving 
the final goal.  
 
Obviously, we need to quantify the variables in order to simulate the behavior of the 
system over time. Nevertheless, quantifying the human and organizational variables 
("soft variables") is a challenge that needs more research. We should recall Coyle's 
question here: "How much value does quantified modeling add to qualitative analysis?" 
(Coyle, 2000) 
 
The application of the methodology for a case study was presented in the preceding 
paragraphs. Another potential case study for testing our methodology is a CTSC pooling 
network, which is in phase of feasibility study. This case is more complicated, because 
several CO2 emitter industries (power plants, oil refineries, chemical and petrochemical 
plants, cement production units, etc.) are involved in pooling network. Since the 
engineering work of this case has not been carried out, the required information are not 
completely available. Therefore, the methodology will be adapted for the second case. 
 
 
4. Conclusion and future work 
 
In this paper, we proposed a new framework of risk analysis for Capture, Transport and 
Storage of CO2 (CTSC). The framework has two novel aspects: integrated and dynamic. 
System dynamics has been applied to understand the structure of CTSC system. 
Subsequently, the integrated risk analysis framework has been developed by applying 
system dynamics as a support of risk analysis for CTSC complex system. The ultimate 
goal is to maintain the safety control system reliable. The technical, human and 
organizational elements playing a role in realizing this goal have been modeled. For the 
moment, we have developed a static model for a CTSC case study. Two separate 
models are developed for the technical and organizational/human systems. The next step 
is to merge these two models. In this step, feedbacks appear due to human-machine 
interfaces. The simulation and models of failure scenarios are under development. 
Nevertheless, a question is still open to answer. The question is: to what extent 
quantifying the soft variables will be helpful for the risk analysis? Further research is 
required to answer this question.  
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